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South Africa has seen a groundswell of protests in the past few years. The number of arrests 
during protest action has likewise increased. In June 2017 the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) 
challenged the constitutionality of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 in the Western 
Cape High Court. This was an appeal from the magistrates’ court in which 21 members of 
the SJC were convicted of contravening the Regulation of Gatherings Act for failing to provide 
notice. This is the first court challenge to the constitutionality of the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act. Although the challenge was brought on restricted grounds, it highlights the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act as a sharp point of controversy. This article will consider the regulatory provisions 
and the extent to which they restrict the constitutional right to protest, particularly in light of the 
important role played by protest in South Africa’s constitutional democracy.
Protest continues to be a subject of much-
heated debate.1 This is no less the case in legal 
circles, where the focus is on finding a balance 
between the right to protest contained in 
section 17 of the Constitution,2 and respecting 
the other rights in the Bill of Rights. This balance 
is meant to be embraced in the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act,3 a piece of legislation intended 
to give effect to section 17 in more detail. But 
the Act has been the subject of much criticism 
for going too far in its regulation because 
it constrains the rights of those wanting to 
protest. Protest is a tool of communication for 
those who lack access to alternative avenues 
of dissent. The important role that protest has 
played in delivering a constitutional democracy 
must continue to be at the forefront when the 
Act is analysed. In this vein, the Constitutional 
Court noted as follows: 
So the lessons of our history which 
inform the right to peaceful assembly 
and demonstration in the Constitution, 
are at least twofold. First, they remind us 
that ours is a ‘never again’ Constitution: 
never again will we allow the right of 
ordinary people to freedom in all its forms 
to be taken away. Second, they tell us 
something about the inherent power 
and value of freedom of assembly and 
demonstration, as a tool of democracy 
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often used by people who do not 
necessarily have other means of making 
their democratic rights count. Both these 
historical considerations emphasise the 
importance of the right.4
The importance of the right to protest in South 
Africa mirrors the global perspective that the 
right deserves state protection. Section 17 
gives effect to South Africa’s international 
obligations, including the right to peaceful 
protest, which is protected under Article 21 
of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights5 and Article 11 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights6 – 
both of which have been ratified by South 
Africa. But this remains unsettled terrain in 
South Africa and beyond. In 2011 the Human 
Rights Council appointed a special rapporteur 
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association, in acknowledgment of 
the importance of the right to protest and 
the need to monitor its protection globally.7 
Current Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai has 
recently issued a request for an invitation 
to conduct a country visit to South Africa. 
This provides a unique opportunity to re-
evaluate the South African legal framework 
for the protection of protests in terms of the 
Constitution, and to evaluate whether it falls in 
line with international trends. To that end, this 
article focuses on the Act’s compliance within 
the national framework.
Regulation for regulation’s sake should be 
avoided, unless it can be shown that the 
purpose for the regulation and the minutiae 
of the regulation are justifiably linked in a way 
that does not substantially erode the right 
to protest. This article will evaluate some of 
these minutiae in the context of assessing 
the legal framework required to facilitate the 
right to protest. It will do so by providing some 
background to protest in South Africa, the 
legal framework for protest in the Constitution 
and the Act, and raising some of the potential 
challenges to the Act.
Protest in South Africa
South Africa has seen a marked increase in the 
number of protests in the past few years.8 The 
most obvious explanation is that the immense 
social problems present in South Africa, 
inherited from apartheid, pose a threat to the 
social order.9 Protest never completely stopped, 
even in the honeymoon period immediately 
post-1994, but there was a clear increase in the 
number of protests in the late 1990s. This has 
been explained as the effects of an increased 
neo-liberal economic policy that ignored the 
realities of poor people, seeing a marked rise 
in unemployment and poverty.10 Although 
commentators have tried to chart a timeline 
for the increased number of protests, there is 
no single moment in time when protests visibly 
increased, nor is there only one reason that 
explains why protests may have increased.11
This is illustrative of the importance of protest 
in the make-up of South African society. The 
role of protest in the anti-apartheid struggle 
was indisputable as a mechanism for applying 
pressure on the state. The anti-apartheid 
strategy involved the use of mass protest to 
challenge the apartheid government and the 
social and legal relations that underpinned 
its existence. Post-apartheid, since 1990, 
new social movements have emerged, for 
example the Concerned Citizens Forum, the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), and the 
Landless People’s Movement. This can be 
explained by the fact that many of the social 
movements that played key roles in opposition 
to apartheid were absorbed into government 
structures post-1994.12 More recently, new 
movements have formed, such as Reclaim the 
City, the Social Justice Coalition, and Ndifuna 
Ukwazi. A number of well-publicised protests 
are attributable to these new and emerging 
social movements. A recent example is the 
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series of protests in Sea Point, Cape Town, 
challenging the sale of the Tafelberg Remedial 
School Building to a private school.13 
This sale is taking place despite previous 
engagements on the use of the property for 
the development of affordable housing closer 
to the central business district (CBD). The 
issues central to various social movements 
are varied, spanning land, housing, policing, 
education, sanitation, and economic policy, 
among others. The upsurge in social 
movements and protest is symptomatic of the 
lack of genuine structural change, specifically 
socio-economic transformation.14 
Increasingly, social movements are formed to 
target issues related to government politics, 
including government structures and state 
corruption.15 Political protests tend to occur 
in swells, for example, in and around election 
times,16 or before an important parliamentary 
vote or court case. The most recent example 
is the Unite Behind Coalition protest that 
brought together various actors in civil society 
to pressurise the ANC to vote in favour of the 
no-confidence vote tabled in Parliament against 
President Jacob Zuma on 8 August 2017.
The activism employed by social movements, 
even where it involves protest, has clear 
strategies and leadership and has some 
middle-class support. Social movements are 
therefore distinguishable from grassroots or 
community-based groups that tend to be 
more organic and temporary, often without 
clear leadership or targeted strategies.17 Habib 
describes these organic groups as ‘a survivalist 
response of poor and marginalised people who 
have no alternatives in the face of a retreating 
state that has refused to meet its socio-
economic obligations to its citizens’.18 These 
loose groupings are responsible for the bulk of 
protests that are referred to as ‘service delivery 
protests’. This ‘service delivery’ descriptor has 
been described as a misnomer that incorrectly 
focuses the protest on services rather than 
the fact that ‘protest often has more to do 
with citizens attempting to exert their rights to 
participate and have their voices heard rather 
than simply demanding “service delivery” as 
passive recipients’.19 Bond and Mottiar describe 
these protests as ‘popcorn protests’, referring 
to the phenomenon in which protest action 
spontaneously flares up temporarily and then 
disperses soon thereafter.20 
Protests are therefore important as the only, 
or at least primary, means that some groups 
have of social sanction to hold the state 
accountable.21 Particularly for those who have 
historically been excluded from mainstream 
party politics, protest is a tool through which 
political rights may be reclaimed.22 Without 
substantial socio-economic reform, including 
addressing unemployment, the number of 
protests, and the issues that will be targeted 
through protest strategies, are likely to continue 
to increase. 
Legal authority for protest 
in South Africa
The constitutional right to protest
Section 17 of the Constitution effectively 
enshrines the national right to protest, and 
distinguishes between three such forms, 
namely assemblies, demonstrations and 
pickets. Section 17 reads, ‘Everyone has the 
right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to 
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.’ 
Section 17 has been described as a right 
that ‘vouchsafes a commitment to a form of 
democracy in which the will of the people is not 
always mediated by political parties and the 
elites that run them’.23 This was a right hard-
fought for in the constitutional negotiations, 
and its importance must be understood in the 
context of the previous criminalisation and 
prohibition of protest under apartheid. The court 
in SATAWU v Garvas said:
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The right to freedom of assembly is 
central to our constitutional democracy. 
It exists primarily to give a voice to 
the powerless. This includes groups 
that do not have political or economic 
power, and other vulnerable persons. It 
provides an outlet for their frustrations. 
This right will, in many cases, be the only 
mechanism available to them to express 
their legitimate concerns. Indeed, it is one 
of the principal means by which ordinary 
people can meaningfully contribute to 
the constitutional objective of advancing 
human rights and freedoms. This is 
only too evident from the brutal denial 
of this right and all the consequences 
following therefrom under apartheid. In 
assessing the nature and importance of 
the right, we cannot therefore ignore its 
foundational relevance to the exercise 
and achievement of all other rights.24
Like other rights in the Bill of Rights, section 
17 must be balanced against other rights and 
interests, particularly the right to life,25 dignity,26 
freedom and security of the person,27 and 
property.28 While section 17 is automatically 
subject to the limitations clause contained 
in section 36 of the Constitution,29 the 
construction of the right includes internal 
qualifiers to the right to protest: in order 
to be lawful, a protest must be peaceful 
and unarmed. This has been confirmed by 
case law such as Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v 
SACCAWU,30 and the Constitutional Court 
case of SATAWU v Garvas.31 Davis has said 
that there is no constitutional protection for 
‘armed assemblies’ because of the potential 
for assemblies to become violent when 
participants are armed.32 The requirement of 
‘peaceful’ has been described as:
In practice a gathering will be considered 
non-peaceful if the public and private 
interests (the public order, persons and 
property) are violated or threatened by 
violent or riotous action to such an extent 
that the limitation of the right, by prohibiting 
that particular action would in any case 
have been justified in terms of section 36.33 
There are differing opinions about what 
constitutes ‘weapons’ and is considered 
‘violence’ that violates the requirement for 
protests to be peaceful and unarmed. This is 
because it is not sufficient to reduce violence to 
‘legal categories’ without an understanding of 
violence ‘as social construction[s]’.34 The World 
Health Organization defines violence as:
[t]he intentional use of physical force 
or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group 
or community, that either results in or has a 
high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment, 
or deprivation.35
This definition comprehends a broad scope 
of violence, which includes the use of threats 
and power. More importantly, by including 
social deprivation, this definition implies that 
structural violence also forms part of a wider 
understanding of the concept.36 Although a 
more thorough discussion of the differences 
across definitions of violence falls outside the 
ambit of this article, it is important to note that 
a wider definition may be relevant to the proper 
interpretation of the scope of the right in 
section 17. 
The role of the Regulation 
of Gatherings Act 
The implementation of section 17 is also 
qualified externally through the Regulation 
of Gatherings Act. The preamble to the Act 
emulates some of the language of section 17, 
stating that:
[E]very person has the right to assemble 
with other persons and to express his 
views on any matter freely in public and 
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to enjoy the protection of the State while 
doing so; and the exercise of such right 
shall take place peacefully and with due 
regard to the rights of others.37
The Act therefore protects not only the 
right to protest but also the right to state 
intervention that facilitates the right to protest. 
The Act is intended to provide the practical 
guidelines for persons who seek to enjoy the 
constitutional right to protest, and also sets 
out the responsibilities of the state in managing 
protests. The function of the Act is therefore a 
regulatory one.38
The state facilitation of protests is a marked 
departure from the Riotous Assemblies Act,39 
which previously governed the area of protest. 
The Riotous Assemblies Act in section 2(1) 
permitted the Minister of Law and Order 
(hereafter the Minister) to authorise a magistrate 
to prohibit a public gathering if, in the opinion 
of the minister, there was a serious threat to 
public order.40 The Minister was also permitted 
to prohibit certain persons from attending or 
addressing public gatherings in defined areas 
for periods at a time.41 Protest was considered 
a severe challenge tantamount to war by 
the apartheid state.42 For this reason many 
gatherings were banned. 
The promulgation of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act was a process that began with 
the Goldstone Commission on the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation.43 The 
commission’s mandate was to investigate public 
violence and make recommendations to prevent 
public violence, a focus that became ingrained 
in the operation of the Act.44 For instance, the 
still present definition of ‘Minister’ in the Act is 
a reference to the Minister of Law and Order 
(a name changed to the Minister of Justice 
post-1994). This may be viewed as a simple 
example, but it is one that provides a metaphor 
for the focus in the Act on ‘order’ rather than 
‘regulation’. The Goldstone Commission, 
besides publishing numerous reports on 
various types of public violence, produced the 
draft Act that was promulgated in 1993. This 
timeline is important for understanding that 
the Act is the product of a particular context, 
where a democratic government had not yet 
been elected. The Act was recommended 
and passed through Parliament via the same 
institutions that were part of the machinery to 
enforce apartheid. This, at least to some 
extent, taints the authority of the Act, as it casts 
doubt that it is truly aimed at facilitating the right 
to protest. 
The procedure for lawful 
protest in the Act 
There are three primary components to the Act. 
The first component involves the provisions 
that ought to apply prior to a protest taking 
place. These include the role of the convener 
(section 2), the notice procedure (section 3), 
consultations, negotiations and conditions 
(section 4), how protests can be prohibited 
(section 5) and the procedures for appeal or 
review of such prohibition (section 6). The 
second component concerns conduct during 
a gathering (section 8) and the powers of the 
police during a protest (section 9). The third 
component addresses the post-protest phase, 
namely liability for damages (section 11) and 
offences and penalties (section 12). 
The terms for protest used in the Act differ 
from those used in section 17 of ‘assembly’ 
and ‘picket’. The Act makes use of two terms, 
namely ‘demonstration’ (which is used in 
section 17) and ‘gathering’.45 The primary 
distinction in the Act is that a demonstration 
involves more than one but fewer than 15 
persons and does not require prior notice,46 
while a gathering is an assembly, concourse or 
procession of more than 15 persons in a public 
space and does require prior notice.47 Neither 
of the terms is properly defined in the Act, 
except by the use of additional terms in relation 
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to gatherings (namely assembly, concourse or 
procession), which are equally undefined. This 
definitional confusion is a direct result of the 
Act’s enactment pre-Constitution, and 
provides grounds for re-evaluation and 
clarification of terms. 
There are various parties that are given 
specific roles in relation to a lawful protest. The 
participants mentioned in the Act are the South 
African Police Service (SAPS), a local authority 
(ordinarily a municipality), and the convener 
of the gathering, who is the formal point of 
contact for the protesting group. These parties 
are known as the ‘golden triangle’ and are the 
primary parties involved in communications 
related to a gathering.48 Chamberlain succinctly 
describes the process that must be followed 
prior to a protest:
A convener must send a notification to 
the municipality of an intended gathering, 
using a standard form supposed to be 
available from all municipal offices. Notice 
must be given at least seven days before 
the planned gathering. On receipt of the 
notification, the municipality must, within 
24 hours, call the convener to a meeting 
at which the logistics of the gathering are 
discussed with the South African Police 
Services (SAPS) and any other required 
service providers, such as paramedics.49
Many of the problems with implementation 
involve this organising meeting. This is 
discussed further under the challenges to the 
Act below. 
Notice must be provided at least 48 hours 
prior to the intended protest in terms of section 
3(2), failing which, the requirements for a lawful 
protest have not been met. There are also other 
means by which a gathering can be prevented. 
Section 9 deals with police powers in relation to 
a gathering. A gathering can be averted under 
section 9(2) after it has commenced, on the 
grounds that the gathering poses a danger to 
persons or property. The discretion to determine 
if such grounds exist lies with a member of the 
SAPS of, or above, the rank of a warrant officer.
Section 5 is concerned with the powers of a 
responsible officer, defined in section 1(xiv) as ‘a 
person appointed in terms of section 2(4) (a) as 
responsible officer or deputy responsible officer, 
and includes any person deemed in terms of 
section 2(4) (b) to be a responsible officer’.50 
Section 5(2) gives a responsible officer the 
discretion to allow or disallow a gathering on 
reasons relating to public safety. This discretion 
is somewhat constrained, as it requires the 
responsible officer to form a reasonable belief 
that it is not possible to amend the conditions 
of the gathering, or that the SAPS or traffic 
services will not be able to prevent the gathering 
from resulting ‘in serious disruption of vehicular 
or pedestrian traffic, injury to participants in 
the gathering or other persons, or extensive 
damage to property’, on the basis of information 
supplied under oath. 
Thus, the Act permits substantial discretion 
to state authorities in their determination of 
whether a gathering may proceed. Where 
an authorised officer or court exercises the 
discretion to prohibit the gathering, those 
convening a gathering (section 12(1)(a)) and 
those participating in such a gathering (section 
12(1)(e)) are at risk of criminal sanction in terms 
of the Act. The punishment for these offences 
could be a fine not exceeding R20 000, or 
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both a 
fine and imprisonment.51 
Beyond the requirement for prior notice, the 
Act is vague as to what constitutes a lawful 
protest. It has been criticised for stating the 
requirements for conduct at a gathering in 
the negative because it clearly states what 
conduct is unacceptable, while it implies or 
requires deduction that the reverse conduct is 
acceptable.52 An example that illustrates this is 
section 8(7), which prohibits the wearing of a 
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‘disguise or mask or any other apparel or item 
which obscures his facial features and prevents 
his identification’.53 On the other hand, there 
are other subsections that are clearer in stating 
desirable conduct, for example, section 8(2), 
which requires that the convener ensure that all 
marshals and participants are informed of the 
conditions attached to that particular protest.54
Challenging the Act 
The most well-publicised critique of the Act 
relates to the requirement that notice must be 
given to the local authority no less than seven 
days before the planned gathering, and at 
minimum 48 hours prior to the protest.55 Where 
notice is not given within the stipulated time, the 
responsible officer has the discretion to prohibit 
the protest.56 The responsible officer enjoys 
the discretion to prohibit without qualification. 
In other words, the mere fact that notice was 
not given timeously is grounds for prohibition. 
There is no further requirement that the planned 
protest should lack relevant logistical planning, 
is likely to affect traffic flows or pose any harm 
to those who will participate, other persons, 
or property, before the discretion to prohibit 
can be invoked. It seems that the responsible 
officer need not have actually considered the 
information supplied through the notice before 
prohibiting the protest.  
The core of the SJC’s constitutional challenge 
to the Act centred on the notice requirement, 
and specifically the criminalisation of the 
convener for the failure to provide such notice. 
This was an appeal from the magistrates’ 
court in which 21 members of the SJC were 
convicted of contravention of section 12(1)
(a) of the Gatherings Act.57 The facts suggest 
that the SJC planned a demonstration which 
by definition includes fewer than 15 people 
and carries no notice requirement. On the 
facts, it appears that the number fluctuated 
throughout the period of the protest and 
eventually exceeded 15, rendering it a gathering 
as defined in the Act – specifically a gathering 
for which notice was not provided. Interestingly, 
the SJC did not argue that the gathering was 
spontaneous, which is a defence specifically 
included in section 12(2).
There was seemingly agreement between 
the appellants (members of the SJC) and the 
respondents (the state and the minister of police) 
that the objectives of providing notice, namely 
to allow for planning of logistics, including route, 
number of marshals, water supplies, health 
services etc., are important. This is obvious from 
the Heads of Arguments from the legal counsel 
of both parties.58 The point of contention was 
the necessity to criminalise the convener for 
failing to provide notice. 
The second respondent argues that gatherings 
in which no notice has been given ‘bear a 
higher risk of not being peaceful’.59 In my view, 
the state has conflated a peaceful protest with 
the risk of chaos that may result if logistical 
planning is lacking. It is logical to assume that a 
protest where sufficient marshals are present, for 
example, will generally facilitate a gathering that 
is better ordered. But a lack of order at a protest 
does not automatically render the protest itself a 
non-peaceful one. 
If the true purpose of the notice period is to 
afford the opportunity for negotiation on logistical 
matters, the criminalisation of the convener for 
failing to give notice is not directly related to the 
stated objective. The second respondent argues 
that criminalisation has a deterrent effect, and 
failing to criminalise may incentivise deliberate 
decisions not to provide notice.60 One of the 
considerations under a limitations analysis under 
section 36 of the Constitution is whether there 
are any less restrictive means of achieving the 
purpose behind the limitation of rights.61 While 
criminal law is useful in setting social norms, 
there are other ways of doing this. One such 
option would be to impose a civil fine. It seems 
clear, though, that prohibiting a protest for failure 
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to provide notice goes much further than 
section 17’s internal limitations, in so far as 
it criminalises the convening or attending 
of a gathering even where it is peaceful 
and unarmed.62
The failure to give notice criminalises the 
convener but it is not clear whether the 
protest itself is criminalised. Section 12(1)(e) 
states that a person who ‘attends a gathering 
or demonstration prohibited in terms of this 
Act’ is guilty of an offence with the same 
punishment applicable to a convener under 
section 12(1)(a). As a protest for which 
timeous notice has not been given may be 
prohibited, the Act does appear to criminalise 
attending such a gathering. The fact that the 
Act does not explicitly criminalise the protest 
is a fiction if anyone attending can be 
arrested at a prohibited gathering. The SAPS 
seems to consider a protest without notice to 
be unlawful.63
The Act has been criticised publicly and 
widely on the basis of its implementation. 
The notice requirement in the Act is not 
intended to require permission from the 
local authority or SAPS. In fact, section 4 
sets out procedures for further negotiation 
or the setting of conditions that may resolve 
any logistical issues that would render the 
protest prohibited. However, civil society 
organisations have routinely reported 
that local authorities have interpreted the 
requirement as affording them the discretion 
to veto the protest, often without effective 
negotiation on aspects of planning that could 
be improved.64 While an argument in response 
is that this is an issue of implementation 
rather than the legislation itself, as the Act 
invokes the use of the SAPS and other 
local authorities, such as municipalities, the 
machinery imagined by the Act needs to be 
reconsidered. It should take into account that 
the SAPS and municipalities lack the capacity 
and understanding to implement the Act in 
a manner that respects the right to protest.65 
These institutions have failed to transform their 
institutional culture, which previously had a 
narrow focus on law and order.66 This affects the 
Act’s ability to meet the constitutional obligation 
on the state to respect the right to protest.  
To find that a constitutional right has been 
unjustifiably limited, it must be determined 
whether an infringement of a right is justified 
under the limitations clause.67 While this article 
will not perform the full limitations analysis, there 
are a few points that must be mentioned. In 
assessing whether the purpose of the limitation 
is important,68 that the limitation has limited 
scope,69 and that there is a clear correlation 
between the limitation and its purpose, the 
limitation must make the least amount of inroad 
into the right, and serve a compelling purpose.70
The Constitutional Court, in considering the 
ambit of section 17, has said that the fact that 
gatherings are regulated beyond section 17 
is not in itself a limitation of the constitutional 
right.71 On the other hand, the court held that 
compelling reasons would have to be shown 
to justify an interpretation of the right to 
assembly that is more restrictive than the 
provision permits.72 
To properly give effect to the constitutional right 
in section 17, the Act should make it easier for 
ordinary persons to navigate the procedures for 
themselves. Challenging a condition imposed 
on, or the prohibition of a gathering requires 
an urgent application to be made to a high 
court for appeal or review (section 6). This will 
require in almost all cases the assistance of a 
legal representative. Chamberlain describes 
the difficulties faced by the Women of Marikana 
to hold a peaceful protest, succeeding only 
through the intervention of lawyers.73 If we agree 
with Alexander’s description of the groundswell 
of protests as a ‘rebellion of the poor’,74 then 
we have to appreciate the need for a right to 
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protest where those marginalised from political, 
social and economic power are able to access 
the right for themselves. If lawyers are necessary 
to the effective implementation of the Act, then 
the legal framework is failing to give effect to the 
right to protest. 
As the analysis in this article shows, there are a 
number of aspects of the Act that have no clear 
correlation to the purpose of the limitation, or 
that go too far in regulating for the sake of law 
and order, rather than to facilitate protest. 
Conclusion
The increase in the number of protests has 
been accompanied by a clear increase in the 
number of people arrested at protests.75 This 
is a continuation of the apartheid trend of state 
resistance to dissent. In a context where protest 
has become the only means for certain groups 
to communicate their marginalisation, strong-
arm tactics by the SAPS are likely to further 
reduce trust in the police,76 and create the 
impetus for further protest:
A state that obstructs or prevents peaceful 
protests, deems them unlawful, or uses 
force to disperse or deter them, is not only 
violating the right to freedom of assembly 
but also creating conditions that invite 
violence. It is in the state’s own interest to 
ensure that protests can occur, and that 
they can occur peacefully.77
The challenge by the SJC of criminalisation for 
the failure to give notice under the Act is a test 
of the appetite of the courts to find that the Act 
fails to meet constitutional standards. While the 
judgment is eagerly awaited, there are a number 
of other aspects of the Act that require scrutiny. 
The fact that the Act was conceived during 
apartheid is reason enough to re-consider its 
definitions, processes and scope. 
This article has argued that the Act’s regulation 
beyond section 17’s internal limitations goes too 
far, thereby potentially unjustifiably limiting the 
right to protest. The over-regulation described 
in this article includes the criminalisation of any 
participant to a prohibited protest, the failure of 
the legal framework to anticipate implementation 
problems as a result of the powers given to 
institutions that have remained untransformed, 
and the obvious need for lawyers to navigate 
the procedures. These issues point to the 
Act’s failure to give effect to the constitutional 
right to protest. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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